FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL FOREIGN DIPLOMATS INVOLVED WITH THE CYPPRUS ISSUE: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME EVER THAT A SUGGESTION FOR A DIERCT G/C-TURKEY DIALOGUE IS PUT FORWARD BY A TURKISH COMENTATOR. IT IS WORTH LISTENING TO HIM. THIS ARTICLE APPEARED ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP WEBPAGE.
The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: "Time for Turkey and Greek Cypriots to Start Talking"
Didem Akyel
18 January 2010
In Cyprus, leaving things until the last minute, then scrambling to try to get them done as a deadline approaches, is as popular as it is in other Mediterranean cultures. It has cursed several past rounds of talks on reunifying the one million people on the island, divided politically since 1963 and militarily since 1974. With the latest process stalling, the time has come for a radical move that brings Greek Cypriots and Turkey fully into the negotiations.
After holding over 60 tête-à-tête meetings during 16 months, the leaders of the 80 per cent majority Greek Cypriot and 20 per cent minority Turkish Cypriot communities have now launched a new and “intensified” phase of reunification talks. A first three-day session starting on 11 January focused only on governance, with two other negotiating areas – economy and EU affairs – waiting to be discussed in the second round scheduled for 25 January. Time allowing, deliberations on property issue may also take place. But even the successful completion of these talks would still leave unresolved the three remaining thorny issues of territory, security and guarantees and citizenship. The UN has already announced that the leaders will take a break at the end of the month so that Turkish Cypriot leader Talat can start campaigning for re-election in April.
Hopes for achieving a quick convergence on governance were set back when a package of proposals given by Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat to his Greek Cypriot counterpart Demetris Christofias on 7 January was rejected as “unacceptable” three days later in a meeting of Christofias with all Greek Cypriot party leaders. On 12 January, Christofias brought his own package to the table, but his proposals restated his government’s previous positions and did not respond directly to the Turkish Cypriot ones.
The Turkish Cypriots’ ten-item package included broad rights to be given to constituent states in external relations (e.g. signing treaties with third parties), although it also allowed a future president or vice-president to take such agreements to a Constitutional Court before they entered into force. At the same time, the package underlined the single sovereignty principle, while maintaining the “equal status” of the constituent states and the “distinct identity and integrity of both communities” whose relationship is based on “political equality” where one does not claim authority over the other.
One hard-to-implement demand was to grant the same rights – including the four freedoms of movement of goods, capital, services and persons – to Turkish and Greek citizens on the island until Turkey joins the EU. The package also asked for two separately-managed flight information regions (FIRs), local police for each constituent state in addition to a federal force, and legal recognition for past acts of the legislative, executive or judicial authorities in the north prior to the agreement.
In previous rounds of negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side had already made the key concession of a rotating presidency and vice presidency, with four years as president for the Greek Cypriot leader against two years for the Turkish Cypriot. The Turkish Cypriot proposals demanded a three-to-two-year ratio. The Turkish Cypriot side demanded that there be a 12-member Cabinet with a seven-to-five ratio, instead of the Greek Cypriot proposal of a nine-member cabinet with a six-to-three ratio. The package wanted to grant veto rights to the president and vice president.
The proposals demanded enhanced representation for Turkish Cypriots in the legislative and administrative institutions of the new state. Passing laws would need qualified voting that effectively include the possibility of one community vetoing proceedings by walking out, and Turkish Cypriots would be over-represented in relation to their population in certain governmental institutions. At the same time, a key Turkish Cypriot concession was to accept Greek Cypriot demands for simultaneous cross-voting in presidential elections and an eventual 20 per cent weighted vote granted to Greek Cypriots when voting for Turkish Cypriot candidates.
In addition to the contents of the package – very unrealistic in some parts, but in others clearly the product of hard-fought compromises between Turkish doves and hawks – the way it was presented clouded its chances. Even though it is prefaced with a statement that “insofar as the internal balance of the proposal is observed, the Turkish Cypriot side is ready to consider any constructive suggestion that may come from the Greek Cypriot side,” presentations in Turkish media smacked of a “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude. For sure, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side could help the process by toning down anything that can sound like a demand for a confederal arrangement, which fuels Greek Cypriot fears that Turkey is trying to legitimise the current de facto state in the north.
Despite the Greek Cypriot parties’ dismissal of the Turkish Cypriot proposals, Christofias has gone on with the talks, apparently understanding that the Greek Cypriot side risks seeming the less constructive side in the eyes of the international community. Having rejected the last U.N. plan for a settlement in 2004 – a plan strongly backed by the EU and the U.S. – the Greek Cypriots cannot once again risk another public relations failure.
And the Greek Cypriots seem to have realized that time is running out to reach a deal. The Turkish Cypriot side had been asking for months to speed up the negotiations, yet Christofias only agreed to intensified talks now, when the April elections amongst Turkish Cypriots are already looming ominously over the process.
There is still time to get out of this impasse. The Turks and Greek Cypriots must establish broader channels of communication through which misinformation can be corrected and prejudices on both sides overcome to secure the confidence needed for a comprehensive federal deal.
As the larger party (not to mention the one maintaining a garrison on north Cyprus of at least 21,000 soldiers, or, according to the Greek Cypriots, 43,000 soldiers), it would make sense for Turkey to take the lead in reaching out broadly to Greek Cypriots and generating a minimum of trust. The Greek Cypriots should not to miss that chance if the invitation comes. They must find a way to start talking directly to Turkey. Turkey has already offered direct talks with Greek Cypriots, on the condition that the Turkish Cypriot leader and the Greek government are in also involved in a balanced way. This could even be in the form of Christofias and Talat visiting Ankara, and then Athens, in turn. The Greek Cypriots have rejected this format for a meeting, although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with it. Greece and the Greek Cypriots may not want Athens to be involved, but historically, it has always been linked to the problem and can be part of the solution. Even today, there are probably as many Greek flags in the Republic of Cyprus as there are Turkish flags flying next to the Turkish Cypriot flag, and Christofias is heading to Athens next week for special consultations on Cyprus with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.
The Greek Cypriot argument that this will pave the way to partition by somehow promoting the status of the Turkish Cypriot leader is not a strong argument, and certainly misses the point of what is at stake. If this round of talks fails, that will be the surest route to partition, resulting in great losses for Cypriots and all others affected by the dispute.
The mutual lack of understanding between Greek Cypriots and the Turks of Turkey was amply voiced by Greek Cypriot coalition-partner DIKO’s deputy head Andreas Angelides when he said last week, “Turkey has no reason to give us anything”. Greek Cypriots seem blind to the fact that Turkey feels the same about them, since Greek Cypriots appear to be sitting pretty in the EU, from where they block nearly half of Turkey’s EU membership negotiating chapters.
People should not fool themselves: further postponements of a settlement will have dire consequences for all sides. A breakthrough that brings the Turkish government and the Republic of Cyprus into the same room is now urgent. After so many decades of delays to a solution on the bicommunal, bizonal basis first set out in 1977, the problem is that if indeed there is to be yet another postponement, the basis for any such reunification will have been completely whittled away.
Didem Akyel is a Research Assistant with Crisis Group's Turkey/Cyprus Project.
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Turkey. Show all posts
Wednesday, 20 January 2010
Wednesday, 16 December 2009
IS TURKEY MOVING AWAY FROM EUROPE?
BY Soner Çağaptay
Is Turkey moving closer to the European Union or away from it? For Ankara’s EU accession to move forward, Turkey needs to align with the union not only in its domestic policies, but also in its foreign policy.
Increasingly, however, Turkish foreign policy is pulling away from Europe. This is because “Econo-Islamism,” a doctrine blending business deals with a religio-political view of the world, is in charge in Ankara. This is bad news for Europe.
Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has pursued rapprochement with Russia, Sudan and Iran, and has established intimate ties with Hamas. In Europe, this orientation of Turkish foreign policy had, until recently, been interpreted as neo-Ottomanist, i.e. a “secular” attempt to re-assert itself in the Ottoman realm, to the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic community.
However, this perception has recently started to shift. For example, last April the AKP objected to Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO’s secretary-general, citing Mr. Rasmussen’s handling of the “cartoon crisis” as offensive to Muslims.
This is shocking, especially because in February, Istanbul’s AKP government ran an anti-Western and anti-Semitic cartoon exhibit in the city’s downtown Taksim metro station. As a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey told me: “The Rasmussen and cartoon incidents are telling: The AKP sees itself as the tribune of the politically-defined and [politically]-charged Muslim world to the West, and not as an emissary of the West to the Muslims.”
The AKP’s Econo-Islamist foreign policy empathizes not with Muslims – that would be quite normal. Rather, the party chooses to align itself with Islamist and anti-Western regimes. This policy attitude surfaces lucidly if one compares the party’s attitude to Israel’s Gaza War with Sudan’s Darfur Campaign.
At the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chided the Israeli president for “knowing well how to kill people.” Erdoğan then returned to Ankara to host the Sudanese vice-president.
The AKP is ticked not when Islamists kill non-Muslims; during the Gaza War, Mr. Erdoğan denied that “Hamas' rockets are causing casualties in Israel.” Nor is the party ticked when Islamists kill Muslims – on Nov. 8, Mr. Erdoğan said: “I know that Sudanese leader al-Bashir is not committing genocide in Darfur because al-Bashir is a Muslim and Muslims do not commit genocide.”
A recent U.N. report said al-Bashir is responsible for killing 300,000 Sudanese citizens while the international court for war crimes has called for his arrest. Yet, the AKP stands for al-Bashir and his crimes against fellow Muslims.
This is because the party supports Islamist regimes that confront the West, siding with such regimes regardless of their nature. This viewpoint is Islamist and inherently anti-European.
Subsequently, Turkey’s ties with its traditional Western allies, including Washington, have suffered. Turkey’s relations with Europe have also deteriorated; initially after 2002, the AKP aggressively pursued EU accession, but since membership talks actually began in 2005, while European objections to Turkey’s EU membership mounted, the party’s energy for the union fizzled away because of a lack of interest by the AKP to fulfill Turkey’s European destiny.
The AKP’s foreign policy favors Islamist and anti-Western regimes. Accordingly, the party has shied away from criticizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, invited Hamas leaders to Ankara and built close relations with Qatar.
The AKP’s axis with these actors came under the limelight during the 2008 Gaza War. Instead of joining moderate Arab countries, including Egypt and Kuwait to discuss an end to the conflict in January, Mr. Erdoğan’s officials met with leaders of Iran, Sudan and Qatar, upstaging the moderates.
In addition to a religio-political view of Turkey’s neighborhood, trade deals have also shaped the AKP’s foreign policy. Growing Qatari investments in Turkey and trade with Syria are material factors that underpin the party’s foreign policy.
One arm of the AKP’s foreign policy has been to help pro-AKP businessmen get mega energy contracts and business deals in Sudan, Iran and Russia. When the AKP came to power, Russia was Turkey’s eighth-largest trading partner and the West dominated two-thirds of Turkish trade.
By 2008, the West’s share of Turkish trade dropped to 50 percent, while Russia replaced Germany as Turkey's top trading partner. Personal ties between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mr. Erdoğan have buttressed rapprochement, transforming Turkish-Russian relations that have been marked by confrontation since the 15th century.
As a result, during the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Turkey sided with Russia when Moscow attacked Georgia.
Econo-Islamism is a far cry from the traditional pro-European orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Under this new foreign policy doctrine, Turkey will opt out of a NATO consensus on Iran, build intimate relations with Russia and disagree with Europe on Sudan. The AKP doctrine does not consider Turkey as being a part of Europe.
* This column originally appeared in The Jerusalem Post, and was reproduced 17.12.2009 in the Turkish daily News - member of the Hurriyet group. Soner Çağaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and author of “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?” (Routledge, 2006.)
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Is Turkey moving closer to the European Union or away from it? For Ankara’s EU accession to move forward, Turkey needs to align with the union not only in its domestic policies, but also in its foreign policy.
Increasingly, however, Turkish foreign policy is pulling away from Europe. This is because “Econo-Islamism,” a doctrine blending business deals with a religio-political view of the world, is in charge in Ankara. This is bad news for Europe.
Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has pursued rapprochement with Russia, Sudan and Iran, and has established intimate ties with Hamas. In Europe, this orientation of Turkish foreign policy had, until recently, been interpreted as neo-Ottomanist, i.e. a “secular” attempt to re-assert itself in the Ottoman realm, to the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic community.
However, this perception has recently started to shift. For example, last April the AKP objected to Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO’s secretary-general, citing Mr. Rasmussen’s handling of the “cartoon crisis” as offensive to Muslims.
This is shocking, especially because in February, Istanbul’s AKP government ran an anti-Western and anti-Semitic cartoon exhibit in the city’s downtown Taksim metro station. As a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey told me: “The Rasmussen and cartoon incidents are telling: The AKP sees itself as the tribune of the politically-defined and [politically]-charged Muslim world to the West, and not as an emissary of the West to the Muslims.”
The AKP’s Econo-Islamist foreign policy empathizes not with Muslims – that would be quite normal. Rather, the party chooses to align itself with Islamist and anti-Western regimes. This policy attitude surfaces lucidly if one compares the party’s attitude to Israel’s Gaza War with Sudan’s Darfur Campaign.
At the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chided the Israeli president for “knowing well how to kill people.” Erdoğan then returned to Ankara to host the Sudanese vice-president.
The AKP is ticked not when Islamists kill non-Muslims; during the Gaza War, Mr. Erdoğan denied that “Hamas' rockets are causing casualties in Israel.” Nor is the party ticked when Islamists kill Muslims – on Nov. 8, Mr. Erdoğan said: “I know that Sudanese leader al-Bashir is not committing genocide in Darfur because al-Bashir is a Muslim and Muslims do not commit genocide.”
A recent U.N. report said al-Bashir is responsible for killing 300,000 Sudanese citizens while the international court for war crimes has called for his arrest. Yet, the AKP stands for al-Bashir and his crimes against fellow Muslims.
This is because the party supports Islamist regimes that confront the West, siding with such regimes regardless of their nature. This viewpoint is Islamist and inherently anti-European.
Subsequently, Turkey’s ties with its traditional Western allies, including Washington, have suffered. Turkey’s relations with Europe have also deteriorated; initially after 2002, the AKP aggressively pursued EU accession, but since membership talks actually began in 2005, while European objections to Turkey’s EU membership mounted, the party’s energy for the union fizzled away because of a lack of interest by the AKP to fulfill Turkey’s European destiny.
The AKP’s foreign policy favors Islamist and anti-Western regimes. Accordingly, the party has shied away from criticizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, invited Hamas leaders to Ankara and built close relations with Qatar.
The AKP’s axis with these actors came under the limelight during the 2008 Gaza War. Instead of joining moderate Arab countries, including Egypt and Kuwait to discuss an end to the conflict in January, Mr. Erdoğan’s officials met with leaders of Iran, Sudan and Qatar, upstaging the moderates.
In addition to a religio-political view of Turkey’s neighborhood, trade deals have also shaped the AKP’s foreign policy. Growing Qatari investments in Turkey and trade with Syria are material factors that underpin the party’s foreign policy.
One arm of the AKP’s foreign policy has been to help pro-AKP businessmen get mega energy contracts and business deals in Sudan, Iran and Russia. When the AKP came to power, Russia was Turkey’s eighth-largest trading partner and the West dominated two-thirds of Turkish trade.
By 2008, the West’s share of Turkish trade dropped to 50 percent, while Russia replaced Germany as Turkey's top trading partner. Personal ties between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Mr. Erdoğan have buttressed rapprochement, transforming Turkish-Russian relations that have been marked by confrontation since the 15th century.
As a result, during the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, Turkey sided with Russia when Moscow attacked Georgia.
Econo-Islamism is a far cry from the traditional pro-European orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Under this new foreign policy doctrine, Turkey will opt out of a NATO consensus on Iran, build intimate relations with Russia and disagree with Europe on Sudan. The AKP doctrine does not consider Turkey as being a part of Europe.
* This column originally appeared in The Jerusalem Post, and was reproduced 17.12.2009 in the Turkish daily News - member of the Hurriyet group. Soner Çağaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and author of “Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?” (Routledge, 2006.)
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Monday, 30 November 2009
ΓΕΩΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΑ ΠΑΙΓΝΙΔΙΑ ΜΕ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΣΤΟ ΕΠΙΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΟ
Τα γεωστρατηγικά προβλήματα του Αμερικανού Προέδρου Ομπάμα στην περιοχή δεν φαίνεται να έχουν τέλος. Η αδυναμία του να απεμπλακεί από το Ιράκ και το Αφγανιστάν συντηρούν πονοκεφάλους για τους οποίους δεν βρήκε ακόμα αποτελεσματικό παυσίπονο. Τυχόν αποχώρηση του από το Ιράκ, δημιουργείται στην περιοχή ένα κενό που ο ίδιος και ο προκάτοχος του ήθελε πολύ να μην επιτρέψει στο Ιράν να καλύψει –αυτός είναι και ο φόβος που προκαλεί και τις συνεχείς κρίσεις με το Ιράν. Διαπιστώνει όμως τώρα ότι το κενό καλύπτεται μάλλον από την Τουρκία σε μια περίοδο όπου τα προβλήματα Ουάσιγκτον-Άγκυρας αυξάνονται παρά να μειώνονται και παρά την επίσκεψη του στην Τουρκία. Και σε μια περίοδο που η Τουρκία αναπτύσσει το περιβόητο δόγμα Νταβούτογλου για τον διεκδικούμενο τουρ-κικό ηγεμονικό ρόλο στην περιοχή, γεγονός που προσθέτει και δεν αφαιρεί στους πονοκεφάλους του Αμερικανού Προέδρου.
Την ερχόμενη εβδομάδα ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός θα βρίσκεται στην Ουά-σιγκτον και θα έχει συνάντηση με τον Πρόεδρο Ομπάμα. Και με αφορμή αυτή τη συνάντηση, το αμερικανικό περιοδικό Νιούσγουηκ διαπιστώνει ότι «κερδισμένοι είναι οι Τούρκοι» από το αδιέξοδο στο Ιράκ. Γράφει:
«Η Τουρκία, η παλαιά βάση της οθωμανικής ισχύος, έκανε ότι καλύτερο μπο-ρούσε για να μην εμπλακεί στον πόλεμο, απαγορεύοντας ακόμη και την διέ-λευση από τουρκικό έδαφος αμερικανικών δυνάμεων στην εισβολή του 2003. Κι’ όμως, είναι οι Τούρκοι –και όχι οι Ιρανοί όπως ισχυρίζονται ορισμένοι παρατηρητές- που αναδεικνύονται τώρα ως οι πραγματικοί νικητές του πολέμου. Σε οικονομικούς όρους, η Τουρκία συναγωνίζεται το Ιράν ως ο μεγαλύτερος εμπορικός εταίρος του Ιράκ, ενώ οι αμερικανικές εταιρείες βρίσκονται καθηλωμένες στο περιθώριο. Σε όρους περιφερειακής επιρροής, η Τουρκία δεν έχει αντίπαλο.»
Όπως γράφει το περιοδικό, οι Αμερικανοί πολιτικοί σχεδιαστές ανησυχούν ακόμα για τις διαφορές της Τουρκίας με το Ισραήλ, για την ισλαμική στρο-φή της Τουρκίας, για τις σχέσεις που αναπτύσσει με το Ιράν και άλλες ισ-λαμικές χώρες. Από την άλλη, οι ανησυχίες της Ουάσιγκτον –και των Βρυ-ξελλών- αυξάνονται από το αναμφισβήτητο γεγονός ότι με διπλωματική δραστηριότητα του Ντεβούτογλου, η θεωρία του για μηδενικά προβλήματα με τους γείτονες της Τουρκίας, υλοποιείται (Συρία, Αρμενία, ανοίγματα στην Ελλάδα κλπ) με αποτέλεσμα να αποκτά αξιοπιστία και αποτελεσματικότητα ο διαμεσολαβητικός ρόλος που διεκδικεί στην περιοχή –στις σχέσεις Χα-μας-Φατάχ, στο Παλαιστινιακό, κλπ.
Αυτός είναι και ο λόγος για τον οποίο αποτελεί στρατηγικό στόχο ορισμένων στην Ευρώπη –του Λονδίνου, για παράδειγμα- ο «εξευμενισμός» της Τουρ-κίας και η ανώδυνη ένταξη της στην ΕΕ. Και αυτό αποτελεί και την εξήγηση της στάσης της ΕΕ στο θέμα των υποχρεώσεων της Τουρκίας έναντι της Κύ-πρου στο πλαίσιο της ενταξιακής της πορείας. Αλλά αποτελεί και ένα ερώ-τημα για όσους υποδεικνύουν στην Ευρώπη τι θα πρέπει να πράξει. Και αν δεν το πράξει; Να καταφύγει η Κύπρος στο βέτο, λένε, αγνοώντας και ισορ-ροπίες και γεωστρατηγικά συμφέροντα και ισοζύγια. Χωρίς, προφανώς, να γνοιάζονται για τις συνέπειες μιας πολύ πιθανής αποτυχίας.
Όλα τα πιο πάνω αγγίζουν και το Κυπριακό, καθώς ο Έρτογαν θα θέσει το θέμα στον Ομπάμα και τη συνάντηση τους στην Ουάσιγκτον, ενώ ο Νταβού-τογλου κατευθύνεται στις επόμενες ημέρες στην Αθήνα, όχι με άδεια χέρια. Αποκαλυπτικό είναι ο σημείωμα του Γιουσούφ Κανλί στην Turkish Daily News:
Crucial months for Cyprus
Monday, November 30, 2009
The Cyprus peacemaking process may take a dramatic turn this month. The period from now until mid-February will be decisive in seeing whether the U.N.-sponsored direct talks between Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Dimitris Christofias can lead to a resolution on the eastern Mediterranean island.
Talat, accompanied by Foreign Minister Hüseyin Özgürgün, arrived in Ankara on Monday for a one-day working visit. He is scheduled to hold talks with President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The Turkish Cypriot president is then set to return to northern Cyprus on Tuesday afternoon, although it was unclear whether the scheduled meeting for that day between him and Christofias would take place.
The sudden visit to Ankara by Talat and Özgürgün indicates some extraordinary developments in the Cyprus peacemaking process. During this same time period, Erdoğan is scheduled to make a trip to Washington, D.C., for a meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama during which the Cyprus problem is expected to be discussed as well.
Meanwhile, there is the upcoming Dec. 10 and 11 meeting of European leaders, during which the progress in Turkey’s EU-accession process and Turkey’s compliance with its obligations – including its so-far-unfulfilled pledge to open up its ports and airports to all new European Union members, including the Cyprus Republic – will be discussed.
For some time, there have been claims that some members of the Turkish Cypriot negotiation team were preparing in collaboration with executives from the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Cyprus Desk some “illuminating” proposals in the hopes of helping overcome the deadlock in the direct talks – particularly in the discussions about power sharing and property.
The “fresh ideas” concocted were expected to be unveiled by Talat at the talks ahead of the Erdoğan-Obama meeting and the forthcoming EU Council meeting. These claims, however, could not be verified thus far.
Yet there are strong signs – including Talat’s sudden and unscheduled Ankara trip – that the Turkish Cypriot side will unveil some last-ditch compromise offers to the Greek Cypriot side to reaffirm its strong political will for a bitter compromise settlement on the island before the Obama meeting and the EU Council’s Brussels meeting.
The Greek Cypriot side, however, continues playing to the gallery with the rhetoric that the aim of the process was not to create a new partnership federation of two constituent entities on the basis of political equality, bi-zonality and bi-communality, but to reformat the constitution of the existing Cyprus Republic with some federal components.
Election gimmicks?
It is obvious to any Cyprus watcher that the current talks have a natural deadline even though the Greek Cypriot side refuses to accept a timetable or a deadline for the process.
Though the Turkish Cypriot parliament has not yet made a final decision on the date, northern Cyprus will likely go to presidential elections April 18. Current public-opinion polls indicate that hawkish Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu leads pro-settlement Talat by at least 9 percentage points. Though this writer strongly believes that Talat has a good chance of re-election, opinion polls thus indicate that the next Turkish Cypriot president might be a personality not as pro-settlement as Talat.
Now there are claims as well that Christofias and Talat have agreed to an intensified negotiations schedule – including at least four meetings a week starting in January – even if they may not agree on a final settlement plan by the middle of February, when the process will be halted because of the elections, in order to prepare at least a general outline of the “prospective settlement.”
Such a document would, of course, help Talat explain to his frustrated electorate his failure to live up to his 2005 election pledge to resolve the Cyprus problem “within a year,” regain some of his lost prestige and boost his chances of re-election. In a way, such a development would largely be an election gimmick.
On the other hand, the expectation of a “Cyprus opening” has started to be created by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government.
Yet there are claims from very credible sources that both in the power sharing and property headings, the sides may reach an “almost agreement” by mid-February and leave the guarantees, settlers and territorial headings until after the elections.
With all my skepticism that there ever will be a federal Cyprus settlement, it appears the next few months will indeed be crucial for Cyprus.
Την ερχόμενη εβδομάδα ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός θα βρίσκεται στην Ουά-σιγκτον και θα έχει συνάντηση με τον Πρόεδρο Ομπάμα. Και με αφορμή αυτή τη συνάντηση, το αμερικανικό περιοδικό Νιούσγουηκ διαπιστώνει ότι «κερδισμένοι είναι οι Τούρκοι» από το αδιέξοδο στο Ιράκ. Γράφει:
«Η Τουρκία, η παλαιά βάση της οθωμανικής ισχύος, έκανε ότι καλύτερο μπο-ρούσε για να μην εμπλακεί στον πόλεμο, απαγορεύοντας ακόμη και την διέ-λευση από τουρκικό έδαφος αμερικανικών δυνάμεων στην εισβολή του 2003. Κι’ όμως, είναι οι Τούρκοι –και όχι οι Ιρανοί όπως ισχυρίζονται ορισμένοι παρατηρητές- που αναδεικνύονται τώρα ως οι πραγματικοί νικητές του πολέμου. Σε οικονομικούς όρους, η Τουρκία συναγωνίζεται το Ιράν ως ο μεγαλύτερος εμπορικός εταίρος του Ιράκ, ενώ οι αμερικανικές εταιρείες βρίσκονται καθηλωμένες στο περιθώριο. Σε όρους περιφερειακής επιρροής, η Τουρκία δεν έχει αντίπαλο.»
Όπως γράφει το περιοδικό, οι Αμερικανοί πολιτικοί σχεδιαστές ανησυχούν ακόμα για τις διαφορές της Τουρκίας με το Ισραήλ, για την ισλαμική στρο-φή της Τουρκίας, για τις σχέσεις που αναπτύσσει με το Ιράν και άλλες ισ-λαμικές χώρες. Από την άλλη, οι ανησυχίες της Ουάσιγκτον –και των Βρυ-ξελλών- αυξάνονται από το αναμφισβήτητο γεγονός ότι με διπλωματική δραστηριότητα του Ντεβούτογλου, η θεωρία του για μηδενικά προβλήματα με τους γείτονες της Τουρκίας, υλοποιείται (Συρία, Αρμενία, ανοίγματα στην Ελλάδα κλπ) με αποτέλεσμα να αποκτά αξιοπιστία και αποτελεσματικότητα ο διαμεσολαβητικός ρόλος που διεκδικεί στην περιοχή –στις σχέσεις Χα-μας-Φατάχ, στο Παλαιστινιακό, κλπ.
Αυτός είναι και ο λόγος για τον οποίο αποτελεί στρατηγικό στόχο ορισμένων στην Ευρώπη –του Λονδίνου, για παράδειγμα- ο «εξευμενισμός» της Τουρ-κίας και η ανώδυνη ένταξη της στην ΕΕ. Και αυτό αποτελεί και την εξήγηση της στάσης της ΕΕ στο θέμα των υποχρεώσεων της Τουρκίας έναντι της Κύ-πρου στο πλαίσιο της ενταξιακής της πορείας. Αλλά αποτελεί και ένα ερώ-τημα για όσους υποδεικνύουν στην Ευρώπη τι θα πρέπει να πράξει. Και αν δεν το πράξει; Να καταφύγει η Κύπρος στο βέτο, λένε, αγνοώντας και ισορ-ροπίες και γεωστρατηγικά συμφέροντα και ισοζύγια. Χωρίς, προφανώς, να γνοιάζονται για τις συνέπειες μιας πολύ πιθανής αποτυχίας.
Όλα τα πιο πάνω αγγίζουν και το Κυπριακό, καθώς ο Έρτογαν θα θέσει το θέμα στον Ομπάμα και τη συνάντηση τους στην Ουάσιγκτον, ενώ ο Νταβού-τογλου κατευθύνεται στις επόμενες ημέρες στην Αθήνα, όχι με άδεια χέρια. Αποκαλυπτικό είναι ο σημείωμα του Γιουσούφ Κανλί στην Turkish Daily News:
Crucial months for Cyprus
Monday, November 30, 2009
The Cyprus peacemaking process may take a dramatic turn this month. The period from now until mid-February will be decisive in seeing whether the U.N.-sponsored direct talks between Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Dimitris Christofias can lead to a resolution on the eastern Mediterranean island.
Talat, accompanied by Foreign Minister Hüseyin Özgürgün, arrived in Ankara on Monday for a one-day working visit. He is scheduled to hold talks with President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The Turkish Cypriot president is then set to return to northern Cyprus on Tuesday afternoon, although it was unclear whether the scheduled meeting for that day between him and Christofias would take place.
The sudden visit to Ankara by Talat and Özgürgün indicates some extraordinary developments in the Cyprus peacemaking process. During this same time period, Erdoğan is scheduled to make a trip to Washington, D.C., for a meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama during which the Cyprus problem is expected to be discussed as well.
Meanwhile, there is the upcoming Dec. 10 and 11 meeting of European leaders, during which the progress in Turkey’s EU-accession process and Turkey’s compliance with its obligations – including its so-far-unfulfilled pledge to open up its ports and airports to all new European Union members, including the Cyprus Republic – will be discussed.
For some time, there have been claims that some members of the Turkish Cypriot negotiation team were preparing in collaboration with executives from the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s Cyprus Desk some “illuminating” proposals in the hopes of helping overcome the deadlock in the direct talks – particularly in the discussions about power sharing and property.
The “fresh ideas” concocted were expected to be unveiled by Talat at the talks ahead of the Erdoğan-Obama meeting and the forthcoming EU Council meeting. These claims, however, could not be verified thus far.
Yet there are strong signs – including Talat’s sudden and unscheduled Ankara trip – that the Turkish Cypriot side will unveil some last-ditch compromise offers to the Greek Cypriot side to reaffirm its strong political will for a bitter compromise settlement on the island before the Obama meeting and the EU Council’s Brussels meeting.
The Greek Cypriot side, however, continues playing to the gallery with the rhetoric that the aim of the process was not to create a new partnership federation of two constituent entities on the basis of political equality, bi-zonality and bi-communality, but to reformat the constitution of the existing Cyprus Republic with some federal components.
Election gimmicks?
It is obvious to any Cyprus watcher that the current talks have a natural deadline even though the Greek Cypriot side refuses to accept a timetable or a deadline for the process.
Though the Turkish Cypriot parliament has not yet made a final decision on the date, northern Cyprus will likely go to presidential elections April 18. Current public-opinion polls indicate that hawkish Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu leads pro-settlement Talat by at least 9 percentage points. Though this writer strongly believes that Talat has a good chance of re-election, opinion polls thus indicate that the next Turkish Cypriot president might be a personality not as pro-settlement as Talat.
Now there are claims as well that Christofias and Talat have agreed to an intensified negotiations schedule – including at least four meetings a week starting in January – even if they may not agree on a final settlement plan by the middle of February, when the process will be halted because of the elections, in order to prepare at least a general outline of the “prospective settlement.”
Such a document would, of course, help Talat explain to his frustrated electorate his failure to live up to his 2005 election pledge to resolve the Cyprus problem “within a year,” regain some of his lost prestige and boost his chances of re-election. In a way, such a development would largely be an election gimmick.
On the other hand, the expectation of a “Cyprus opening” has started to be created by Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government.
Yet there are claims from very credible sources that both in the power sharing and property headings, the sides may reach an “almost agreement” by mid-February and leave the guarantees, settlers and territorial headings until after the elections.
With all my skepticism that there ever will be a federal Cyprus settlement, it appears the next few months will indeed be crucial for Cyprus.
Saturday, 7 November 2009
SO MUCH FOR TURKEY'S HIGH MORALE STATURE
Turkey urged to comply with international court verdict
Thursday, November 5, 2009
FULYA ÖZERKAN
ANKARA - Hürriyet Daily News
As Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir travels to Istanbul for a conference, human rights groups are angry with Turkey’s refusal to plan any arrest of the leader, who is accused of war crimes in Darfur. Because Turkey is a part of the United Nations, it has an indirect responsibility to fulfill the demands of the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International says
Controversial Sudanese leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who stands accused of committing war crimes in his country’s western Darfur region, will make his third visit to Turkey to attend a meeting in Istanbul on Monday.
The visit comes after the International Criminal Court, or ICC, issued an arrest warrant for the 65-year-old leader in March on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Al-Bashir will be in Istanbul for a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC.
When asked if al-Bashir would be arrested upon landing in Turkey because of his outstanding arrest warrant, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin remained vague, saying only that the statutory provisions of international law would be fulfilled. His remarks, however, were not clear enough to reveal whether al-Bashir would be arrested.
Turkey has ‘indirect’ responsibility
Turkey is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the world’s first permanent war crimes tribunal, the ICC.
“Yes, Turkey is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not have to abide by its rulings but since the country is a member of the United Nations, it has an indirect responsibility to comply with it because the ICC was established by the United Nations,” Özlem Altıparmak, chairperson of Amnesty International Turkey, told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review.
“Would non-obedience with the arrest warrant cause a headache for Turkey? Legally no, but this is a problem politically,” she said.
Al-Bashir’s government denies charges of ordering civilians to be killed. In October, U.S. President Barack Obama warned Khartoum of more pressure if it fails to respond to his fresh incentives to stop “genocide” and “abuses” in Darfur.
“The United States is strongly committed to pursuing peace in Sudan and believes those who committed atrocities should be held accountable,” Deborah L. Guido, U.S. Embassy spokeswoman in Ankara, told the Daily News. She declined, however, to comment on al-Bashir’s travel plans.
U.N. a ‘claimant’ in al-Bashir case
The Turkish government came under fire for giving a cordial welcome to the Sudanese president and his deputy on past visits.
“Turkey’s being non-party to the Rome Statute has no relevance as it is a member of the U.N. Security Council. The case at the ICC opened in line with a report forwarded by [that council],” said Öztürk Türkdoğan, spokesman for the Turkish Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
“The United Nations is a claimant in this case and Turkey, as its member, should review the decisions of the United Nations,” he said.
The ICC, unlike the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights, prosecutes individuals, not states, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. In the Sudanese leader’s case, the judges did not find enough evidence to charge him with genocide as sought by the court prosecutor although this charge could be added later.
Türkdoğan urged Ankara to assist the ICC. “Turkey has a responsibility also arising from Article 13 of its penal code that opens the way for the trial of those accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with the consent of the justice minister. Turkey’s non-obedience with the arrest warrant also means a violation of its domestic law,” he said.
The government should not pursue an inconsistent policy that criticizes Israel for its actions in Gaza but remains silent on the Darfur issue, Türkdoğan said.
“The process over the U.N. report accusing Israel over Gaza is not finalized yet but the case over al-Bashir is one step further as there is an arrest warrant. Turkey must act as a democratic state governed by the rule of law, otherwise it will face problems in the international arena,” he said.
SOURCE: TURKISH DAILY NEWS
===============================================================
Friday, November 6, 2009
ISTANBUL – Daily News with wires
The European Union asked Turkey to reassess its invitation to Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, wanted by a U.N. court for war crimes, the Reuters news agency reported Friday, citing an anonymous Foreign Ministry source.
Al-Bashir is set to attend a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC, in Istanbul this weekend. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Turkish President Abdullah Gül responded to journalists’ inquiries later on Friday about reconsidering al-Bashir’s visit, the Anatolia news agency reported.
“This is a regional meeting, and as members of international organizations we understand it as such,” he said. “Therefore, we will treat all members equally.”
“Why are they getting involved?” he asked.
An anonymous Turkish government official also told Agence France-Presse on Friday that al-Bashir would not be arrested during his stay in Turkey.
The OIC has invited al-Bashir to an economic summit in Istanbul, and he is expected to be in the city on Sunday and Monday, barring a last-minute change.
"They responded positively to the invitation, and we assume he will be coming, but things may change at the last moment," the Turkish government official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
"To arrest him after having invited him does not seem probable to me," the official said.
The official explained that Ankara is not a signatory of the ICC treaty and "therefore its decisions are not legally binding for Turkey."
Moreover, the arrest warrant for al-Bashir has not been backed up by any U.N. Security Council resolution, she said, adding that Turkey was only the host of the Istanbul meeting, with the list of invitations drawn up by the OIC.
The official conceded Turkey might face criticism from the European Union, which it is seeking to join, and which "has made demands for Turkey to sign the ICC treaty."
The ICC issued the arrest warrant for al-Bashir in March, making him the first sitting president to face such action. The Sudanese leader faces charges on five counts of crimes against humanity and two of war crimes in the western region where the U.N. estimates that up to 300,000 people have died since 2003.
Turkey voiced concerns at the time that the warrant might prove counter-productive for efforts to stabilize conflict-torn Sudan.
A string of African and Arab states along with Sudan's key ally China also slammed the warrant.
Last year, Turkey's government came under fire for hosting al-Bashir twice: a bilateral visit in January and then at multilateral cooperation talks with African leaders in August.
SOURCE: TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Thursday, November 5, 2009
FULYA ÖZERKAN
ANKARA - Hürriyet Daily News
As Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir travels to Istanbul for a conference, human rights groups are angry with Turkey’s refusal to plan any arrest of the leader, who is accused of war crimes in Darfur. Because Turkey is a part of the United Nations, it has an indirect responsibility to fulfill the demands of the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International says
Controversial Sudanese leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who stands accused of committing war crimes in his country’s western Darfur region, will make his third visit to Turkey to attend a meeting in Istanbul on Monday.
The visit comes after the International Criminal Court, or ICC, issued an arrest warrant for the 65-year-old leader in March on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Al-Bashir will be in Istanbul for a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC.
When asked if al-Bashir would be arrested upon landing in Turkey because of his outstanding arrest warrant, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin remained vague, saying only that the statutory provisions of international law would be fulfilled. His remarks, however, were not clear enough to reveal whether al-Bashir would be arrested.
Turkey has ‘indirect’ responsibility
Turkey is not a party to the Rome Statute that established the world’s first permanent war crimes tribunal, the ICC.
“Yes, Turkey is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not have to abide by its rulings but since the country is a member of the United Nations, it has an indirect responsibility to comply with it because the ICC was established by the United Nations,” Özlem Altıparmak, chairperson of Amnesty International Turkey, told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review.
“Would non-obedience with the arrest warrant cause a headache for Turkey? Legally no, but this is a problem politically,” she said.
Al-Bashir’s government denies charges of ordering civilians to be killed. In October, U.S. President Barack Obama warned Khartoum of more pressure if it fails to respond to his fresh incentives to stop “genocide” and “abuses” in Darfur.
“The United States is strongly committed to pursuing peace in Sudan and believes those who committed atrocities should be held accountable,” Deborah L. Guido, U.S. Embassy spokeswoman in Ankara, told the Daily News. She declined, however, to comment on al-Bashir’s travel plans.
U.N. a ‘claimant’ in al-Bashir case
The Turkish government came under fire for giving a cordial welcome to the Sudanese president and his deputy on past visits.
“Turkey’s being non-party to the Rome Statute has no relevance as it is a member of the U.N. Security Council. The case at the ICC opened in line with a report forwarded by [that council],” said Öztürk Türkdoğan, spokesman for the Turkish Coalition for the International Criminal Court.
“The United Nations is a claimant in this case and Turkey, as its member, should review the decisions of the United Nations,” he said.
The ICC, unlike the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights, prosecutes individuals, not states, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. In the Sudanese leader’s case, the judges did not find enough evidence to charge him with genocide as sought by the court prosecutor although this charge could be added later.
Türkdoğan urged Ankara to assist the ICC. “Turkey has a responsibility also arising from Article 13 of its penal code that opens the way for the trial of those accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with the consent of the justice minister. Turkey’s non-obedience with the arrest warrant also means a violation of its domestic law,” he said.
The government should not pursue an inconsistent policy that criticizes Israel for its actions in Gaza but remains silent on the Darfur issue, Türkdoğan said.
“The process over the U.N. report accusing Israel over Gaza is not finalized yet but the case over al-Bashir is one step further as there is an arrest warrant. Turkey must act as a democratic state governed by the rule of law, otherwise it will face problems in the international arena,” he said.
SOURCE: TURKISH DAILY NEWS
===============================================================
Friday, November 6, 2009
ISTANBUL – Daily News with wires
The European Union asked Turkey to reassess its invitation to Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, wanted by a U.N. court for war crimes, the Reuters news agency reported Friday, citing an anonymous Foreign Ministry source.
Al-Bashir is set to attend a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC, in Istanbul this weekend. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.
Turkish President Abdullah Gül responded to journalists’ inquiries later on Friday about reconsidering al-Bashir’s visit, the Anatolia news agency reported.
“This is a regional meeting, and as members of international organizations we understand it as such,” he said. “Therefore, we will treat all members equally.”
“Why are they getting involved?” he asked.
An anonymous Turkish government official also told Agence France-Presse on Friday that al-Bashir would not be arrested during his stay in Turkey.
The OIC has invited al-Bashir to an economic summit in Istanbul, and he is expected to be in the city on Sunday and Monday, barring a last-minute change.
"They responded positively to the invitation, and we assume he will be coming, but things may change at the last moment," the Turkish government official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
"To arrest him after having invited him does not seem probable to me," the official said.
The official explained that Ankara is not a signatory of the ICC treaty and "therefore its decisions are not legally binding for Turkey."
Moreover, the arrest warrant for al-Bashir has not been backed up by any U.N. Security Council resolution, she said, adding that Turkey was only the host of the Istanbul meeting, with the list of invitations drawn up by the OIC.
The official conceded Turkey might face criticism from the European Union, which it is seeking to join, and which "has made demands for Turkey to sign the ICC treaty."
The ICC issued the arrest warrant for al-Bashir in March, making him the first sitting president to face such action. The Sudanese leader faces charges on five counts of crimes against humanity and two of war crimes in the western region where the U.N. estimates that up to 300,000 people have died since 2003.
Turkey voiced concerns at the time that the warrant might prove counter-productive for efforts to stabilize conflict-torn Sudan.
A string of African and Arab states along with Sudan's key ally China also slammed the warrant.
Last year, Turkey's government came under fire for hosting al-Bashir twice: a bilateral visit in January and then at multilateral cooperation talks with African leaders in August.
SOURCE: TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Friday, 30 October 2009
Do not appease Turkey
He was of course referring to Europe’s attempt at a balancing act over Turkey’s refusal to abide by its obligations to the EU as candidate country and Europe’s wish to keep Turkey on track towards its European integration. This is more than evident in its progress report on Turkey, where the British theory of “constructive ambiguity” is gloriously applied.
It is true that if one ignores all reference to Turkey’s responsibility to the EU in relation to Cyprus, what one is left with is a progress report that makes it impossible for Turkey to join unless its policies and attitudes undergo a serious overhauling. Those who hide behind Cyprus’ justified insistence on taking steps against Turkey in order to make her conform with her obligations to defend Turkey’s poor credibility record, should re-examine their position.
This is where the appeasement tactics come into play. Even the authors of the progress report felt compelled to observe that “Turkey continued to express public support for fully fledged negotiations between the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General aimed at a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded.”
In reality however, Turkey is still very far from supporting the negotiations currently going on between the leaders of the two communities on the island, Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat. It is true that Ankara states publically often enough that Turkey supports the procedure under the United Nations which began a year ago. But does Turkey support the parameters of a comprehensive solution agreed upon by the two Cypriot leaders?
When they met on 23rd May 2008 in the presence of Mr. Zerihoun the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on the island, the two leaders reaffirmed that the basis for a solution is the establishment of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal Cyprus, with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship, with political equality, as prescribed by UN SC Resolutions. This was adopted by the United Nations and its efforts to facilitate this procedure rely entirely on what the two leaders have agreed on. One would assume that Turkey’s support to the UN efforts would aim at promoting a solution within the parameters agreed by the two leaders. Unfortunately, one would be wrong to assume this. Turkey supports something entirely different, something that Mr. Christofias and Mr. Talat have not agreed upon. Turkey supports –with daily public statements by all its top leaders, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the rest. What they want is two separate states, which would have limited cooperation at the top; Confederation, in other words.
As it was to be expected, this position put Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader who negotiated the agreed parameters with Christofias, in a spot. What is he supposed to do, ignore what Ankara says and go on as if nothing was said, or conform to the directives from Ankara and the Turkish perceptions of a confederal solution? The fact is that there are 50,000 Turkish troops in the occupied north of the island. There are also more than 200,000 Turkish settlers. Without the economic support of Ankara, the north would not survive. Hence, Talat cannot afford to ignore Turkey’s views. And therefore, one wonders if Mr. Talat is free to negotiate with Mr. Christofias. This may explain why Mr. Talat presents at the negotiating table proposals that run contrary to the agreed parameters.
This explains also why what Christofias says is valid. That the international community and in particular the EU should turn to Turkey and demand that their support to the UN process should also be accompanied with manifest support to what the two leaders have agreed as the parameters of a solution. And this support should be evident and practical. It also explains why the relevant reference in the EU progress report is somewhat misleading, or it tells half the story.
The fact is that Turkey holds the key that could unlock progress on Cyprus and consequently relief EU-Turkish relations of some of the tension generated by Turkey’s stubbornness. And appeasing Turkey would not make the problems go away.
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